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authorVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>2008-09-03 01:02:19 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>2008-09-08 03:20:21 -0700
commit113de4111795af1245a84368c233f25699999908 (patch)
parent1c6f8e1945a2b8317e5dad8fb5cfc882bd35b2b8 (diff)
sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ] The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is sizeof(struct sctp_authkey). Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct, we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d9373c358ab2..05185c772d25 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
goto out;
- if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) {
+ if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;