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authorFlorian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de>2007-11-13 11:12:46 +0100
committerAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>2007-11-13 11:12:46 +0100
commit624e4ff675005168e71d297185f4b75dbdf650af (patch)
treef59d7edef1653c51656d3c167e03b123830acafa
parent07c2420331fc05ff768b35ef8d4de2d17700756e (diff)
PPPOE: fix memory leak (local DoS) (CVE-2007-2525)
This patch fixes a memory leak when a PPPoE socket is release()d after it has been connect()ed, but before the PPPIOCGCHAN ioctl ever has been called on it. This is somewhat of a security problem, too, since PPPoE sockets can be created by any user, so any user can easily allocate all the machine's RAM to non-swappable address space and thus DoS the system. Is there any specific reason for PPPoE sockets being available to any unprivileged process, BTW? After all, you need a packet socket for the discovery stage anyway, so it's unlikely that any unprivileged process will ever need to create a PPPoE socket, no? Allocating all session IDs for a known AC is a kind of DoS, too, after all - with Juniper ERXes, this is really easy, actually, since they don't ever assign session ids above 8000 ... Signed-off-by: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/pppox.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/pppox.c b/drivers/net/pppox.c
index 9315046b3f55..3f8115db4d54 100644
--- a/drivers/net/pppox.c
+++ b/drivers/net/pppox.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
/* Clear connection to ppp device, if attached. */
- if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) {
+ if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) {
ppp_unregister_channel(&pppox_sk(sk)->chan);
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_DEAD;
}